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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES CARLOS FOOTE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS; No. 9000132 
PETE HAUN, Chairman of the 
Utah Board of Pardons; and 
VICTORIA PALACIOS, Member of 
the Utah Board of Pardons, 
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF 
This reply brief is in response to the Respondents' Brief 
filed August 31, 1990 by the Assistant Attorney General. Since 
the Attorney General has raised several items not addressed in 
Petitioner's opening brief, these matters will first be 
discussed. Next, the original arguments made by Petitioner in 
his opening brief will be reiterated in light of the state's 
response. 
DISCUSSION OF INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL CONTAINED 
IN RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Respondents have outlined in general the policies and 
procedures of the Utah Board of Pardons. (Respondents' Brief, 
pp. 7-15). Generally, Petitioner does not disagree with these 
statements since they are elementary principles of administrative 
law and describe the role that the Board of Pardons is to play in 
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the correction system. Several statements made by the 
respondents, however, do require comment. 
First, the Board of Pardons lists numerous factors to be 
taken into account in deciding whether an inmate should be 
paroled. (Respondents1 Brief, p. 10)- It is unknown where this 
list originated since there is apparently nothing in writing 
giving any criteria by which the Board of Pardons chooses to 
release or retain an inmate. Certainly, this type of listing of 
criteria should be made available to the inmate who must appear 
before the Board. As noted in the prior brief of Petitioner, at 
the present time there is virtually no notice of what standards 
will be utilized in determining whether an inmate will be 
released. (Petitionees Brief, pp. 32-33). If the criteria 
listed by the Board of Pardons ift its brief is in fact the 
criteria utilized by it during the inmate proceedings then a 
permanent regulation should be implemented. 
Next, the respondents state that in the interview of October 
4, 1985, "Had Mr. Foote made such a request [to see his record] 
he would have been provided with access to certain portions of 
the file. Additionally, the portions he was not allowed access 
to would have been fully summarized and presented to him at the 
interview on October 4, 1985." (Respondents' Brief, pp. 11-12). 
This same statement is made concerning the February 24, 1988 
hearing and the February 10, 1989 hearing. (Respondents1 Brief, 
pp. 12-13). The Board of Pardons fails to note that Mr. Foote 
was never advised during any of these proceedings that he would 
be allowed to look at his file as is evidenced by the notices of 
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the hearings contained in the Appendix to Petitioner's original 
brief. Moreover, had he made such a request only the barest 
minimum of information would have been given to him since 
everything which is vital to Mr. Footefs hearing has been 
classified as "confidential." Finally, Petitioner knows of no 
procedure in which the Board of Pardons has ever summarized 
information excluded from an inmate. There is nothing in the 
regulations concerning such procedure and to Petitioner's 
knowledge this has never been done with any inmate. 
Moreover, the statement contained in Respondents' brief 
concerning Foote's access to his file is directly contradicted by 
a letter dated October 17, 1989 from Kent M. Barrie, Assistant 
Attorney General, to Petitioner's attorney. That letter (a copy 
of which is contained in the Appendix to this Brief) states the 
following: 
Parole Board files are classified under the 
Archives and Records Services and Informations 
Practices Act. Some of the information contained 
therein is "public", some is "private" and some is 
"confidential". See, §63-2-59, et seq. of the Utah 
Code. Inmates are not allowed to review their 
parole files and this position policy has withstood 
attack in the federal courts. If you are 
interested in some case law in this area, see, 
Gerrish v. Palacios, 87-C-0826A (D. Utah 1987) ; 
aff'd on appeal by the 10th Cir., Case No. 88-1443 
(March 1, 1989). (Emphasis added). 
Later in the brief the Board of Pardons once again 
reiterates that "it will provide a detailed synopsis of those 
materials at any interview involving the offender" if the Board 
views the material as having an influence upon the decision 
making process. (Respondents' Brief, p. 15). Again, Petitioner 
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has no knowledge of such a policy and has had no indication in 
the past from the respondent or its attorneys that such a 
procedure has been or will be utilized. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS MATTER SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED TO 
THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The Board of Pardons contends that this matter should be 
directed to a district court rather than to this Court. 
(Respondents1 Brief, pp. 16-19). The Board argues that the 
district court provides a better forum in which to mediate the 
dispute between Mr. Foote and the Board. The Board contends that 
an evidentiary hearing is necessary in order to examine various 
aspects of Petitioner's claim including the potential impact a 
writ of mandamus would have upon the Board of Pardons, offenders, 
the Department of Corrections and individuals who supply 
information to the Board of Pardons. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 
18-19). 
The position taken by the Board is incorrect. This Petition 
for Mandamus is focused upon the issue as to whether an inmate at 
the Utah State Prison is entitled to any due process right during 
a parole hearing. The position previously taken by the Board of 
Pardons has been flatly that he or she is not. If this Court 
determines as it should that inmates do have a due process right 
under federal or state constitutional law then the question as to 
what process is due may require an evidentiary basis. However, 
this question only becomes relevant after the matter of law as to 
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due process rights has been ruled upon by the state's highest 
court. 
If it is determined that inmates do have due process rights 
then this Court can decide as a matter of law what rights and 
procedures are available to an inmate appearing before the Board 
of Pardons. In the alternative, this Court can require the Board 
of Pardons to formulate new policies and procedures subject to 
this Court's approval or to require a master or district court to 
conduct hearings to establish such procedures. In any event, 
however, the fundamental issues of due process must be decided 
initially before any time is spent as to the exact boundaries 
that due process requires. 
The Merrihew, Crest, and Anderson cases relied upon by the 
Board in its brief (Respondents' Brief, p. 19) are completely 
inapplicable to the instant case. In those cases litigants 
attempted to circumvent statutory avenues of direct appeals from 
administrative decisions by filing writs of mandamus or 
prohibition. Here, there is no statutory avenue for judicial 
review of Board decisions and in fact there is a specific statute 
stating that no appeal can be taken as to the merits of a parole 
board decision. Here, it is not the merits of the decision which 
is being attacked but the procedure claimed under constitutional 
law. 
As a final note it should be added that Petitioner in his 
initial brief contended that a factual hearing may be required 
specifically on the issue of due process and the employment of 
the victim's mother with the Department of Corrections. 
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(Petitioner's Brief, p. 32). In this context a factual hearing 
may be appropriate to the determine what effect if any the 
mother's employment with the Department of Corrections has had 
upon the Board decisions, upon the Board records, or upon any 
other facet effecting Petitioner's parole request. These matters 
of inquiry if required are especially appropriate for a 
factfinder which is ultimately responsible to this Court for 
review. 
POINT II 
A WRIT OF MANDAMUS MAY PROPERLY BE 
ISSUED BY THIS COURT IF IT FINDS THAT 
THE BOARD OF PARDONS HAS SUBSTANTIALLY 
VIOLATED AN INMATE'S RIGHT OR THAT SUCH 
PROCEDURE IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
The Board attempts to limit the power of this Court to issue 
a writ of mandamus only in those instances where it has found the 
Board of Pardons has "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion." (Respondents' Brief, pp. 19-20). While it is true 
that this Court certainly has the power to issue a writ for the 
basis stated by the Board of Pardons, it can also do so when 
constitutional rights have been infringed upon or when a decision 
is capricious and arbitrary. The very citation of Wright 
Development, Inc. v. City of Wellsville, (Respondents' Brief, p. 
20) supports this contention. 
Aside from the authorities previously cited by Petitioner 
(Petitioner's Brief, p. 7) a statement from the Supreme Court of 
Indiana is also useful in defining the role of this review. 
There, the Court stated: 
It is true that there is no right to an 
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appeal, in the usual sense, from the decision of 
the Parole Board, but Due Process requires that 
judicial review be available to insure that the 
requirements of Due Process have been met and that 
the Parole Board has acted within the scope of its 
powers* Murphy v. Indiana Parole Board, 397 
N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. 1979). 
Thus, this Court is empowered both by its own rules and by 
common law to insure that bodies such as the Board of Pardons 
fully comply with the requirements of state and federal due 
process. A writ of mandamus it the appropriate remedy when an 
adjustment is required. 
POINT III 
THE PAROLE HEARINGS CONDUCTED BY THE 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS ARE SUBJECT 
TO DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION. 
It comes as no surprise that the State relies upon the 
Greenholtz majority opinion as well as a number of federal 
district and appellate cases to argue that there is no liberty 
interest created under Utah law which gives rise to a federal due 
process right. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 20-21). Petitioner 
himself admitted that the statutory language alone under these 
previous decisions would preclude a finding of a protected 
liberty interest. (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 15-16). 
Aside from the statutory language, however, Petitioner 
argued that the parole guidelines universally utilized by the 
courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the Parole Board do 
in fact create a federal liberty interest. (Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 17-23). The discussion concerning guidelines is focused 
solely upon the federal due process argument and in no way 
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relates to state due process since Petitioner believes that the 
minority position in Greenholtz should be adopted by this Court 
in a state due process analysis. While ,they may be applicable 
also to state due process Petitioner does not believe that it is 
necessary to reach this question because of the clear 
establishment of a parole system giving rise to a state due 
process expectantcy. The Board of Pardons has, therefore, 
misconstrued this argument by stating that the parole guideline 
argument is being utilized by Petitioner in both the federal and 
state context, (Respondents1 Brief, pp. 24-25). 
As to the guideline argument the State has completely failed 
to address the issues raised by Petitioner. For example, 
Petitioner concedes that the guidelines are not mandatory in 
determining the length of time that a sentence should be served. 
(Respondents1 Brief, p. 25). However, the purpose of the 
guidelines is to establish a fair and universal system of 
punishment so that persons committing the same crime with the 
same background can expect the same type of sentence. These 
guidelines are extensively relied upon by the prosecutor, defense 
attorney, and trial judge in deciding whether to enter pleas or 
in the sentencing process. 
Respondents argue that if the sentencing guidelines were 
mandatory courts would be obligated to follow them even though a 
court may believe that a defendant deserves a longer or shorter 
sentence. (Respondents' Brief, p. 25). As a practical matter a 
Utah trial judge closely follows the guidelines even though he or 
she may have difficulty in accepting the guideline sentence. 
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Under the federal system it is well known that district judges 
are frequently required to impose federal guideline sentences 
even though they believe the sentences should be more severe or 
less harsh* Again, however, the purpose of the guideline is to 
try to establish a system of fairness so that a defendant in one 
county does not receive a sentence which is four times more than 
a similar defendant convicted in another county. 
Admittedly, the Board of Pardons has other factors to 
examine besides the initial sentencing guidelines. Nevertheless, 
when an inmate enters the penetentiary especially based upon a 
guilty plea as in the instant case the inmate is entitled to 
expect that the guideline will be basically followed unless some 
other factor such as poor behavior in prison requires a different 
sentence. It is fundamentally against federal due process to 
represent to a defendant that the guidelines will approximate the 
sentence if a plea is entered and then to basically state after 
incarceration that the guidelines really don't mean anything and 
the Board of Pardons is free to do anything it wishes. 
At the very minimum, federal due process would require that 
in the cases where the guidelines have been exceeded that the 
Board of Pardons must then employ a due process standard in order 
to allow the inmate the opportunity to contest the increased 
sanctions. (See, Petitioner's Brief, pp. 21-22). 
Finally, Petitioner acknowledges that under federal law many 
court decisions have found that no due process right exists based 
upon peculiarities of the state statutory or regulatory system. 
A majority of the string citations relied upon by the state 
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reject federal due process based upon the statutory enacting 
power of a parole system. (See, Respondents' Brief, pp. 22-23, 
fn. 4). None of these cases rejecting federal due process in 
parole proceedings have focused upon state sentencing guidelines 
but instead have relied almost exclusively upon the language of 
the statutory enacting legislation. Thus, the mere creation of a 
state guideline system has created a justified expectancy on the 
part of defendants and inmates which gives rise to a federal due 
process standard. 
POINT IV 
UTAH STATE "DUE PROCESS" CREATES A 
LIBERTY INTEREST IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS GIVING RISE 
TO CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. 
The respondents contend that the language in the Utah 
Constitution in which the word "may" is utilized conclusively 
establishes the absence of any state due process right. 
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 21-22). This argument is completely 
without merit. Obviously, the Constitution is not going to 
require a board of pardons in every case to remit findings and 
forfeitures, commute punishments and grant pardons after 
conviction. All boards of pardons must be given some discretion 
in reviewing the incarceration of an inmate or there would hardly 
be any point in having such a board. The mere fact that the Utah 
Board of Pardons has discretion in deciding the term of 
incarceration of an inmate, however, does not mean that the Board 
is free from applying any due process procedures in those 
proceedings. The two arguments simply do not follow each other. 
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The Board of Pardons contends that "each court that has 
considered the question of whether Utah offenders have a right to 
early release have answered in the negative." (Respondents' 
Brief, p. 22). A review of these cases, however, shows that 
this Court has never specifically addressed the state due process 
argument in the context of the parole proceeding. 
In Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984) this Court cited 
the Greenholtz opinion in stating that -before a parole date had 
been established an inmate has no constitutional right to be 
placed on parole. Id. at 66. State due process was never argued 
in that case as to the general rules of parole nor specifically 
as to whether an interest is created when a parole date has been 
established. It is interesting to note, however, that this Court 
followed the U.S. Supreme Court decision which has held that 
inmates are entitled to procedural due process rights in prison 
disciplinary proceedings for alleged flagrant or serious 
misconduct. It seems strange that the federal courts are anxious 
to apply due process standards and to create a "liberty" interest 
as to inter-prison disciplinary problems but refuse to find such 
an interest when it relates specifically to an inmates freedom 
from incarceration. This inconsistency does not have to be 
adopted under the Utah Constitution. 
The Hatch, Allen, Dock, and Houtz decisions (Respondents1 
Brief, pp. 23-24) are all based upon an analysis of the Utah 
statutory language as applied to federal due process requirements 
under the Greenholtz decision. None of these decisions relate to 
state due process requirements. 
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The Board of Pardons has not addressed the arguments raised 
by Petitioner in his opening brief that state due process should 
follow the dissenting opinion in Greenholtz rather than relying 
entirely upon the words contained in statutory enactments of 
parole board systems. (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 23-28). Further 
argument as to why the dissenting Greenholtz opinion should be 
adopted is therefore unnecessary. 
POINT V 
STATE AND FEDERAL DUE PROCESS REQUIRES 
THAT THE UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS 
EMPLOY A NUMBER OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS 
AT THE TIME OF PAROLE HEARINGS TO INSURE 
THAT CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED PROTECTION 
IS AVAILABLE. 
A. Impartial Hearing. 
The respondents have made no argument in rebuttal to 
Petitioner's claim that he is entitled to a hearing before an 
impartial board of pardons. (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 30-32). 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how such a rebuttal could be 
argued in good faith. As noted earlier in this Brief if there is 
any factual determination that needs to be made in this case it 
would be what effect the employment of the victim's mother with 
the Department of Corrections has had upon the previous Board 
decisions. At the very minimum, this Court should order the 
Board of Pardons to convene members who have no personal 
acquaintance with this lady and to provide a method of insuring 
that the staff members of the Board of Pardons who review and 
assist in the preparation of the hearing have no personal 
relationship with this lady. Certainly, all inmates are entitled 
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to a completely fair and unbiased decision-making board even if 
that board is vested with great discretion. 
B. Notice of Parole Criteria, 
Petitioner maintained in his earlier brief that due process 
requires that the inmate be given timely notice of the hearing as 
well as criteria that will be used by the Board of Pardons in 
determining parole. (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 32-34). The 
respondents have listed a number of factors which are allegedly 
taken into account in determining whether parole will be granted. 
(Respondents1 Brief, pp. 27-28). This extensive list, however, 
is not contained in any regulation or other document available to 
the inmates. Instead, the inmate is instructed only to bring 
written information that he wishes the board to consider. See 
Appendix to Petitioner's Brief. Thus, the inmate is given no 
criteria as to what the Board of Pardons will be considering 
during the hearing. It seems elementary that any person 
appearing before any administrative board or tribunal is entitled 
to know the scope of the proceedings and what is expected of him 
in order to be victorious. This is simply not the case under the 
existing system. 
The cases relied upon by the State are not applicable to the 
arguments raised by Petitioner. In Murphy v. Indiana the court 
relied entirely upon the federal due process Greenholtz analysis 
in concluding that no written criteria was required in any 
decision. Likewise, in Shirley v. Chestnut the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that no due process requirements existed 
under the federal Greenholtz criteria and therefore did not even 
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address the adequacy of any criteria. 
It is submitted that the dissenting Greenholtz opinion is 
persuasive in holding that if due process is required in parole 
hearings that one of the fundamental procedural safeguards is to 
advise an inmate of the criteria of review. The State has not 
refuted this contention. 
C. Access to File. 
As a main contention in this proceeding Petitioner has 
claimed that he is entitled to access of his file so that he may 
examine those documents which the Board bases its decision upon. 
(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 34-44). The respondents have disputed 
this contention in a number of interesting ways. (Respondents1 
Brief, pp. 29-36). First, they again have cited several cases in 
which a liberty interest has not been found thereby eliminating 
any right of due process in accessing information. Schuemann 
v. Colorado State Board of Adult Parole and Candelaria v. 
Griffin cited in Respondents1 brief. 
Next, Respondents rely upon cases in which a liberty 
interest has been found but where the courts find that the board 
of pardons may withhold some information for cause. See 
Coralluzzo v. New York State Parole Board, Tasker v. Mohn, 
Williams v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, and Thompson 
v. New Jersey State Parole Board all cited by the respondents. 
Thus, they concede that information should be given to the inmate 
unless the board can justify its exclusion. Under the present 
procedures of the Board of Pardons, however, no effort has been 
made to devise a system in which some information is given to an 
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inmate and other information is withheld. At the present time 
essentially all useful information is categorically withheld in 
each and every hearing. By declaring such information as 
"confidential" the inmate is denied access. 
In the Thompson v. New Jersey State Parole Board case 
Respondents claim that the "court approved the non-disclosure" 
of certain types of records." (Respondents1 Brief, p 33). As was 
noted in Petitioner's opening brief concerning this same decision 
(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 41-43) the New Jersey Appellate Court 
did not simply allow this designation by the Department of 
Corrections to control. Rather, it created a system of judicial 
review in which the Board of Pardons must now designate whether 
information which was not disclosed to the inmate was utilized in 
the decision making process to deny parole. In such a case then 
a court is entitled to review that information to see if it was 
properly withheld. See 509 A.2d at 251-52. 
Thus, all of these cases have required some judicial 
involvement in the method of selection as to what records will be 
withheld or in a method as to reviewing the propriety of 
withholding that information. In the instant case, the Board of 
Pardons has had no standards as to what information it will allow 
an inmate to see and what information it will not. One may ask 
after reviewing the list of documents that an inmate may not see 
(Respondents' Brief, p. 15) what exactly is left in the file? 
The Respondents claim, "Upon request, an offender is 
permitted to access his file as set forth above. He then has the 
opportunity to present his position regarding the information in 
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the file at the time of any interview before the Board of 
Pardons." (Respondents' Brief, p. 35). This statement is again 
contrary to the statement of the assistant attorney general 
contained in the Appendix and is illusory since an inmate is not 
allowed to examine any meaningful information in his file and 
therefore is unable to present any position with regard to the 
withheld information. 
Nest, Respondents contend that the presentence decisions of 
this Court are distinguishable since the sentencing phase of a 
criminal trial "impacts upon fundamental constitutional 
interests." Respondents then argue that whether an offender 
should be given an early release date does not involve a 
constitutional interest. (Respondents1 Brief, p. 34). Again, 
this response begs the question. If this Court finds that there 
is a sufficient liberty interest either under federal or state 
constitutional requirements then a parole hearing does impact 
upon fundamental constitutional interests. If there is no 
liberty interest in a parole hearing then the question of access 
to files becomes moot. 
The Board also argues that the parole hearing is not 
adversarial and that "the offender is not faced with an 
opponent." (Respondents1 Brief, p. 34). This again is 
contradicted by reality. In many gearings the victims of the 
crime are present and the passionately argue that the inmate 
should not be released upon parole. Even in cases where the 
victim is not physically present the presence of letters from 
alleged victims, prosecutors, judges, and police urging the 
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retention of an inmate certainly creates an opposing force. 
Here, Mr, Foote was continually confronted with a barrage of 
accusations from unknown sources concerning alleged unindicted 
crimes. This situation is therefore much worse than in a trial 
setting since a defendant can confront his accusers. 
Finally, the fact that an inmate must work with some of the 
people evaluating him or the fact that the prison is "sometimes a 
cruel and violent place" does not justify a complete policy of 
withholding of information. While there may certainly be 
instances where it would not be advised for an inmate to see 
certain reports contained in the file these are no doubt rare 
instances just as in the case of presentence reports. 
Furthermore, anonymous hearsay letters sent to the Board should 
receive no protection whatsoever. 
The present system provides no screening procedure 
whatsoever. It arbitrarily denies access to all information 
utilized by the Board in its decision regardless of any 
justification that may be present to deny some access. As noted 
earlier, the repeated references in the respondents' brief as to 
a summary of omitted material being supplied to inmates simply 
does not occur under the present system and even if it did would 
not be satisfactory in providing a balanced safeguard for inmate 
access. 
Either the Board of Pardons must devise a system which is 
fair in allowing inmates access to their files or this Court must 
limit the scope of examination that a Board of Pardons can make. 
It therefore becomes a decision as to whether to provide an 
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inmate with some type of access to unsubstantiated hearsay 
allegations or to simply require that the Board of Pardons not be 
allowed to look at such information if it was not originally 
contained in the presentence report upon which the inmate's 
sentence is based. One way or the other, an inmate is entitled 
to relief under the present system. 
D. Opportunity to Refute 
Respondents have made no attempt to address Petitioner's 
original argument (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 44-49) and therefore 
no additional comment is necessary. 
E. Written Decision Detailing 
the Reasons for Denial of Parole. 
This contention of Petitioner (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 
49-51) has only been briefly touched upon by the respondent. 
(See Respondents' Brief, pp. 28-29, fn. 6). While the Board of 
Pardons contends that its records are sufficient to allow the 
"Board" to review its previous decisions, are sufficient to allow 
a "member of the public" to review the decision and are 
sufficient to allow the "judiciary" to review the decision it 
says nothing about the inmate himself. The regulations of the 
Board of Pardons specifically requires that the inmate be 
notified in writing and that an explanation of the reasons for 
the decision be given in writing. This simply is not done as a 
matter of practice and the inmate has no written documentation as 
to how he or she can improve their chances of release for the 
next hearing. Minimal due process requires at least a cursory 
explanation for withholding liberty for periods as long as two to 
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three years before the next hearing, 
CONCLUSION 
If the Board of Pardons indeed has over 4,000 offenders 
under its jurisdiction (Respondents1 Brief, p. 9) then the 
decision in this case will affect a substantial number of 
individuals each and every year for many years to come. It 
flies in the face of reality to claim that prison inmates have no 
expectancy of release based upon the state guidelines of 
incarceration or that they have no expectancy of release by the 
mere creation of a parole system which may release them many 
years before the end of their sentence. There is hardly any 
situation imaginable in which a "liberty" interest is being 
affected more than incarceration in a state prison. For this 
reason, therefore, minimal due process protection should be 
afforded to the thousands of individuals who are now under the 
jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons. 
Assuming this liberty interest to exist Petitioner has 
attempted to assist the Court in formulating a due process 
standard by which the Board of Pardons should follow. 
Admittedly, there are many areas of procedure which have several 
alternative methods to comply with due process. It may well be 
as the respondents contend that an evidentiary hearing is 
required by a factfinder before some of these procedures can be 
sufficiently established. In any event, however, these inmates 
of the penal institution deserve something substantially more 
than they are now receiving under the present system which openly 
denies any legal protection for continued incarceration and even 
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violates the written policies formulated by the Board of Pardons. 
In conclusion, the remedy in this case may be difficult to 
formulate but difficulty has never stopped this Court from making 
tough decisions. Clearly, the protection of minimal rights for 
these inmates is certainly no less deserving than matters 
affecting taxation, Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1990) or other extremely 
complex areas of litigation. 
For these reasons the Writ of Mandamus should be granted and 
appropriate relief should be entered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Craig S. Cocflfc 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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APPENDIX 
R. P A U L V A N DAJM - AMORNE> GENERA 
6100 S O U HMO LAS, . SM 1 l ^ l C i C i r y , U l A H M l 0 7 • IfcUPHONl HOI 26^ 5Ajrt 
JOSKPIlh M*CH DAVID V THOMAS 
CHtEf DIPU1V AITQKSL> UNlRAl CMIU AUMIN.SIKAIUR 
October 17, 1989 
Craig Stephens Cook 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Rei Carlos James Foote - Inmate No. 17242 
Dear Mr. Cookt 
Thank you for your letter of October 5, 1989 in the above-
captioned matter. 
I apologize if I have created any confusion in this case. I 
answered your inquiries concerning the housing of the Department 
of Correctionn and Board of Pardons in this building because that 
is what you asked. You did not make me aware of any concerns 
you had about past housing arrangements. Unfortunately I am not 
familiar with them, since I only began working in this building 
in April and the Department of Corrections and Board of Pardons 
had been housed here continuously since some time before that. 
I also noticed a typographical error in my August 28, 1989 letter 
to you about the present housing arrangements. In paragraph five 
the fifth sentence should reads She has H& responsibilities 
which would enable her to examine files or surreptitiously place 
materials in them. The wouJ3 MnoM was included in my draft of 
that letter, but was inadvertently left off of the final letter 
sent out by this office. 
If you still feel a new hearing is warranted, your request would 
best be directed formally to the Board itself. I am not 
empowered to grant or deny this type of request. I personally 
have found no evidence of impropriety on the part of the board 
and have no reason to impugn their integrity. 
With respect to a review of Mr. Foote's file, I would be glad to 
as8iBt you in reassuring Mr. Foote that his file is complete. I 
have taken the time to review that file (as I have done with Mr. 
Jensen's) and would be glad to discuss the types of items which 
are contained therein. 
On-ic* CM-
WW AHORNi-YChNhRAl 
MAlhOJ- UIAH 
Parole board files are classified under the Archives and Records 
Services and Informations Practices Act. Some of the information 
contained therein is "public," some is "private" and some is 
"confidential." See S 63-2-59 et seq. of the Utah Code. Inmates 
are not allowed to review their parole files, and.this position 
policy has withstood attack in the federal courts. If you are 
interested in some case law in this area, see Gerrleh v. 
Palacios, 87-C-0826A (D. Utah 1987); affirmed on appeal by the 
Tenth Circuit, case no. 88-1443 (March 1, 1989). 
Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance in this 
area. 
Sincerely, 
KENT M. BARRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
KB/ce 
